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population expansion is that most 
alleles are rare, and are not interrogated 
by standard commercially available 
microarrays. The full extent of what 
is missed became apparent from 
recent population scale re-sequencing 
projects: only 13% of variants with a 
frequency of less than 0.5% had been 
described previously. If rare variants 
make a substantial contribution to your 
disease of interest, beware! GWAS 
won’t find them. You may also have 
read that GWAS doesn’t work because 
GWAS loci cannot account for much of 
the known or estimated heritability of a 
trait (‘missing heritability’). For instance, 
despite finding 180 loci that influence 
height, these loci account for just 10% 
of the variation. But, this does not take 
account of all those SNPs that don’t 
make the significance threshold. They 
can’t simply be ignored, but what to 
do with them? Peter Visscher has an 
answer, using an approach routine in 
plant and animal genetics. Examining 
the effect of all SNPs, regardless of 
statistical significance, almost half of 
height’s phenotypic variance can be 
explained by common SNPs. So is there 
a ‘missing heritability’ problem? Well, 
we still can’t explain all the variance. 
What have we learnt from GWAS? 
Two common complaints are that 
GWAS gives us genetic loci not genes 
(true!) and that lists of genetic loci 
don’t tell us anything about mechanism 
(true too!). One of the insights of the 
ENCODE project is that GWAS hits lie 
preferentially in regulatory regions of 
the genome (enhancers, promoters and 
other less well categorized elements). 
Tying variation at an enhancer to a 
particular gene product is admittedly 
hard, but the nearest neighbouring 
gene hypothesis works well (ENCODE 
again helps here, revealing that action 
on the megabase scale is rare, most 
elements operate over a few tens of 
kilobases). Next generation GWAS are 
now including tests of function, testing 
gene expression patterns of nearest-
neighbour genes in relevant tissues, 
and (impressively) in a GWAS for human
red blood cell phenotypes, haemocyte-
specific RNA interference (RNAi) 
silencing in Drosophila melanogaster.
Does this mean GWAS can deliver 
the holy grail of mechanism? Take 
note, journal editors, genetics is a 
hypothesis-free enterprise! How else 
could mathematicians, statisticians and 
bioinformaticians partake?
Where can I find out more?
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Figure 1. Visualising a GWAS with a Manhattan plot.
The horizontal axis shows the position of every locus that the microarray interrogates. The numbers
denote chromosomes. The vertical axis is the negative logarithm (base 10) of the P-value (logP)
of the association between phenotype and genotype. This plot is based on simulated data, but
the experimenters would be pleased, as there are a number of peaks that exceed a genome-wide
significance threshold (red line). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Children with autism 
do not overimitate
L. Marsh, A. Pearson, D. Ropar,  
and A. Hamilton
Copying the behaviour of others is 
important for forming social bonds 
with other people and for learning 
about the world [1]. After seeing 
an actor demonstrate actions on a 
novel object, typically developing 
(TD) children faithfully copy both 
necessary and visibly unnecessary 
actions [2]. This ‘overimitation’ is 
commonly described in terms of 
learning about the object, but may 
also reflect a social process such as 
the child’s motivation to affiliate with 
the demonstrator [3] or to conform to 
perceived norms [4]. Previous studies 
of overimitation do not separate 
object learning and social imitation 
because they use novel objects. Even 
though researchers consider these 
objects to be causally transparent in 
their mechanism, young children’s 
causal reasoning about novel objects 
is unclear [4]. The present study 
measures the social component 
of overimitation by using familiar 
objects, which preclude the learning 
component of the task. Here we 
report a significant reduction in 
overimitation in children with autism 
spectrum conditions (ASC). This 
is coherent with reports that these 
children have profound difficulties 
with social engagement [5] and do 
not spontaneously imitate action 
style [6] (see also [7]).
We tested 31 children with ASC, 
30 TD children matched for verbal 
mental age and 30 TD children 
matched for chronological age 
on an overimitation task using 
familiar objects. All children were 
assessed for verbal mental age, 
overimitation and understanding of 
action rationality (see Supplemental 
Information). On each of five trials, 
the child was asked to watch 
carefully as a demonstrator showed 
how to retrieve a toy from a box 
or build a simple object. Critically, 
each demonstration included 
two necessary actions (such as 
unclipping and removing the box lid) 
and one unnecessary action (such as 
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Figure 1. Performance of all children on the overimitation and rationality discrimination tasks.
(A) Number of trials where the unnecessary action was copied (maximum 5) in TD and ASC 
participants. There was a significant reduction in overimitation behaviour in ASC participants 
compared to CA-match (F(1,58) = 12.84, p < 0.001) and VMA-match (F(1,58) = 7.01, p = 0.01) 
TD controls. Error bars represent ±1 standard error. (B) Mean rationality discrimination score 
(ranging from –4 to 4) in TD and ASC participants. All three groups performed significantly 
above chance (zero) (CA-match: t(29) = 16.1, p < 0.001; VMA-match: t(29) = 10.2, p < 0.001; 
ASC: t(30) = 5.9, p < 0.001). Children with ASC were significantly worse at judging the rational-
ity of actions, when compared to CA-matched (F(1,58) = 19.62, p < 0.001) and VMA-matched 
(F(1,58) = 9.29, p = 0.003) groups. Error bars represent ±1 standard error. (See also Figure S1 in 
the Supplemental Information.)tapping the top of the box twice). The 
apparatus was then reset behind a 
screen and handed to the child, who 
was instructed “get/make the toy as 
fast as you can”. These instructions 
emphasise the goal, and copying 
was never mentioned. This means 
any overimitation is spontaneous 
and socially motivated. All trials 
were videotaped for analysis, and 
completion of the unnecessary 
action was coded as overimitation. 
After all overimitation trials, children 
watched the demonstrator complete 
individual actions from each 
sequence, and rated each action on 
a five point scale from ‘sensible’ to 
‘silly’.  Rationality discrimination was 
calculated as the difference between 
a child’s rating of the unnecessary 
action and the necessary action from 
the same sequence, with high scores 
indicating good judgement of which 
action is more rational.
All TD children were able to 
complete all tasks and retrieve or 
build the toy on every trial; children 
with ASC completed the tasks on 
97% of trials (see Supplemental 
Information). However, we found a 
striking difference between autistic 
and TD children in both overimitation 
and rationality discrimination. TD 
children copied 43–57% of the 
unnecessary actions but children with 
autism copied only 22% (Figure 1A). 
All groups performed significantly 
above chance in the rationality 
discrimination task, but children with 
autism performed worse than the TD 
children (Figure 1B). These results 
have several implications.
First, TD children show substantial 
overimitation of unnecessary 
actions on familiar objects, despite 
understanding that these actions 
are ‘silly’. These results lend support 
for the position that overimitation 
in typical children is a social 
phenomenon rather than being driven 
by the child’s causal learning about 
the objects. This social overimitation 
may index a child’s motivation [5] to 
affiliate [3] or to conform to perceived 
norms [4].
Second, children with autism 
show significantly less overimitation 
of the demonstrator’s actions. 
This is not driven by weak motor 
skill because all the unnecessary 
actions were familiar simple actions 
(for example, tapping a box) and 
all children were able to complete 
the more complex goal-directed actions in the sequence. It is also not 
driven by superior causal reasoning, 
because the children with ASC also 
performed worse on the rationality 
discrimination task. The data go 
beyond previous studies which 
showed reduced imitation of action 
style [6] and reduced spontaneous 
imitation [8] where differences in 
behaviour could be driven by the 
children with autism failing to adopt 
the same goal as the demonstrator. 
In our task, children are instructed 
that the goal is to make/retrieve the 
toy, and all are able to do so. The 
failure of children with autism to 
spontaneously copy unnecessary 
actions can best be explained in 
terms of reduced social motivation 
in these children, with less desire or 
ability to affiliate with or conform to 
the perceived norm. 
Previous studies have examined 
social attention in autism using eye-
tracking tasks [9], and have examined 
social motivation using brain-imaging of high functioning adults with ASC 
(reviewed in [5]), but simple methods 
for measuring social motivation in 
children did not exist. The ease of 
implementing our task, and the close 
links between overimitation and 
social mimicry in adults [3], mean that 
this approach can provide a powerful 
and general tool for examining 
social motivation in child and adult 
participants. There is an important 
contrast between our results and a 
recent study in which children with 
autism saw unnecessary actions 
on novel objects and showed 
the same rate of overimitation as 
typical children [10]. One possible 
interpretation of this difference is 
that the study using novel objects 
[10] tapped imitation-to-learn which 
may be intact in autism, while social 
imitation, as tested with our simple 
familiar objects, is atypical. Such 
a distinction is congruent with 
previous theories that posit normal 
goal-directed imitation and abnormal 
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researchers have looked to other 
forms of communication, such as 
facial communication, for possible 
evolutionary precursors to human 
speech [1]. Facial communication 
may be particularly relevant for 
understanding the origins of speech, 
because facial movements are 
critical for both the production and 
comprehension of spoken words (for 
example [4]). One common form of 
facial movement observed across a 
wide variety of primate taxa is ‘lip-
smacking’ [5], an action that involves 
rapid opening and closing of the 
mouth and lips [1]. More notably, 
lip-smacking has a periodicity that 
closely matches the periodicity of 
the gaps between syllables in many 
human languages (2–7 Hz [6]). This 
periodicity may be a fundamental 
aspect of human speech; and 
indeed, studies have shown that 
disruption of this rhythm impairs 
our ability to comprehend speech 
[7]. Ghazanfar and colleagues [1] 
recently demonstrated that the facial 
movements involved in macaque 
(Macaca sp.) lip-smacking are very 
speech-like in their synchronization 
and rhythm (features that contrast 
with other facial movements such as 
chewing). These authors suggested 
that lip-smacking may have been an 
evolutionary precursor to speech. 
Primate vocalizations are, however, 
typically produced without movement 
of the lips, jaw, and tongue, resulting 
in a steady sound that lacks the 
undulations of human speech [8]. 
Although some primate vocalizations 
occasionally include limited facial 
movements, such movements are 
neither rhythmic nor do they produce 
speech-like periodicity  (for example, 
the display call of geladas [3]). One 
possible example of a call involving 
complex facial movements is the 
‘girney’ vocalization found in several 
macaque species. Girneys have 
been described as being produced 
in conjunction with lip movements 
and teeth chattering, though 
spectrograms of the call do not 
indicate any periodicity (for example 
[9]). Published spectrograms may 
have missed examples of periodic 
calls that result from simultaneous 
rhythmic facial movements and 
vocalizations; however, at present 
it appears that girneys are simply 
produced in close temporal proximity 
to complex facial movements and 
not simultaneously with them. Even 
Speech-like 
vocalized lip-
smacking in 
geladas
Thore J. Bergman 
Recently, we have seen a surge 
of interest in identifying possible 
evolutionary links between primate 
facial communication and human 
speech (for example [1]). One 
suggestion is that primate ‘lip-
smacking’ — a non-vocal, rhythmic 
movement of lips usually given 
in conjunction with affiliative 
behavior — may have been a 
precursor to speech [1]. This idea 
arose because lip-smacking shares 
several production features with 
human speech that the vocalizations 
of non-human primates lack, 
most notably a 3–8 Hz rhythm [1]. 
Evidence that non-human primates 
are indeed able to vocalize while 
simultaneously producing rhythmic 
facial movements would lend initial, 
but important, support to the notion 
that lip-smacking is a plausible 
evolutionary step towards speech. 
Here, I report that a wild primate, 
the gelada (Theropithecus gelada), 
makes a derived vocalization (the 
vocalization is absent in their close 
relatives, the Papio baboons) that is 
produced while lip-smacking, called a 
‘wobble’. The rhythm of wobbles (6–9 
Hz) closely matches that of human 
speech, indicating that a vocalized 
lip-smack produces sounds that 
are structurally similar to speech. 
Geladas are highly gregarious 
primates with a relatively large 
vocal repertoire. Their independent 
evolution of a speech-like 
vocalization involving complex facial 
movements provides initial support 
for the hypothesis that lip-smacking 
was a precursor to the emergence of 
human speech. 
Research on the evolutionary 
origins of human speech has 
often focused on non-human 
primate (hereafter, primate) vocal 
communication (for example [2]). But 
many critical components of human 
speech are conspicuously absent 
from the vocalizations of primates, 
including a diverse repertoire of 
sounds [3]. Perhaps because of this, social imitation in autism [7], but 
further testing of the circumstances 
that drive children with autism to 
imitate would be valuable.
Overall, our study leads to two 
important conclusions. First, studies 
of social interaction can examine 
the social component of imitation 
behaviour independent of the object-
learning component, and this can 
best be done using familiar objects. 
Second, children with autism do 
not show overimitation of actions 
on familiar objects. This specific 
difference in a behaviour linked to 
social affiliation and norm conformity 
is compatible with claims of abnormal 
social motivation in autism.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental information includes experimen-
tal procedures, supplementary results, discus-
sion, references, one figure and two tables and 
can be found with this article online at  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.02.036.
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